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Abstract 
Atypical work, or alternative work arrangements in U.S. parlance, has long been criticized in 
popular debate as providing poorly-compensated employment. Although the early U.S. literature 
seemed to confirm this perception, more recent cet. par. analysis has offered a partial but 
somewhat more optimistic evaluation. The present paper builds on the latter body of research 
with a view to providing improved estimates of the effect of the full range alternative work 
arrangements on worker compensation. The improvements are basically two-fold. First, we 
account for the skewness in atypical worker earnings while retaining the Mincerian human 
capital earnings function. Second, we deploy additional waves of the main dataset on atypical 
workers (the CAEAS), while supplementing this cross-section analysis with longitudinal data 
from the NLSY. Our analysis covers earnings and (access to) health benefits. We report that 
although one group of atypical workers (contractors) seems to enjoy a wage premium, cross-
section results from the CPS and NLSY for the better-known category of temporary workers 
point to a negative wage differential of some 6-15 percent. It emerges that much of the disparity 
stems from unobserved worker heterogeneity, accounting for which still supports a wage 
advantage for contracting work. As far as fringes are concerned, the appearance in cross section 
of a potentially large deficit in access to health benefits is again reduced after accounting for the 
permanent unobserved individual heterogeneity, although in this case the attenuation is much 
more modest. 
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 I.  Introduction 
The frequency of alternative work arrangements such as consulting, contract, and temporary 
work – more familiarly referred to as “atypical work” outside the United States – has steadily 
increased in recent decades (see, for example, Segal and Sullivan, 1997). Research on the 
phenomenon has tended to focus on the nature and extent of such arrangements and their impact 
on a worker’s employment history (e.g. Addison and Surfield, 2005). The earnings, still less the 
compensation packages, associated with these arrangements have been accorded less attention in 
the literature. But the thrust of the earnings literature is frankly pessimistic: compared with 
regular or open-ended employment, alternative work arrangements often appear to offer inferior 
compensation. Alternative work arrangements might therefore seem to warrant their atypical 
worker tag. 
There are various reasons why atypical workers might earn less than regular workers.  
The  standard  model sees employer use of, say, agency or contract workers as a means of 
covering leave or as providing a flexible buffer stock allowing the firm to meet uncertain or 
fluctuating demand. In the voluntary sorting process that results, there will be a match between 
worker preferences and job characteristics. Agency jobs offering no firm-specific training will be 
filled by workers who, for a variety of reasons (Booth et al., 2002), do not wish to take advantage 
of the training option. Groups with marginal attachment to the workforce together with younger 
and older workers may be expected to be over-represented among the ranks of agency workers 
and to  receive lower wages by virtue of  differences in their human capital. (Note that this 
buffering story – the strategic use of outside contractors to smooth the work load of the regular 
labor force – hinges on the exogeneity of the temporal flow of work. Flexibility in the timing of 
the work to be performed might otherwise allow it to be carried out by the regular workforce 
during off-peak periods; see Abraham and Taylor, 1996.) Observe that heterogeneous 
preferences among workers are insufficient to produce an atypical worker pay penalty – what 
Hirsch (2005, p. 526) terms an “equilibrium wage gap” – that remains after factoring in human 
capital differences. Such a gap requires heterogeneous (non-fungible) workers, and employers 
who are not indifferent as between the agency and regular workers.   
The firm’s use of atypical workers, and agency workers in particular, may be a response 
to informational problems in the hiring process and lead to wage gaps. Firms may be wary of 
offering permanent contracts to workers who may turn out to be lemons. Agency workers can 
  1reduce the costs to firms of hiring ‘risky workers,’ namely, those with poor work histories, and 
may be a more efficient solution to the informational problem than the probationary contract. For 
example, if agencies are more adept at screening and matching workers, their use raises the 
probability that the worker will prove suitable – and cheaper to hire and fire if unsuitable (Booth 
et al., 2002). The wage implications are transparent, since workers are in effect pricing 
themselves into regular employment (without upsetting the morale/productivity of incumbents) 
and the agency is selling information on worker quality to firms. The groups of workers in 
question will include displaced workers (see Farber, 1999) in addition to labor market entrants 
and younger workers. A formal model of the use of agency workers for screening purposes is 
offered by Houseman et al. (2003), who argue that this process will be strongly pro-cyclical.
1 
The authors’ also argue that the relief offered firms through the use of agency temporaries in 
tight labor markets can also result in a positive wage gap for workers in high-skill occupations 
(see below). 
Even so, negative wage gaps may be more apparent than real. One possibility here is that 
(unmeasured) worker ability and employment in an alternative work arrangement might be 
negatively correlated. In this case, the unfavorable wage gap will be attributable not to the 
employment arrangement but instead to lesser ability. In other words, faulty inferences between 
earnings and type of work arrangement may be drawn if low-ability workers sort themselves into 
alternative work arrangements. 
A positive wage gap might apply to atypical work if the aggregate demand for these 
alternative work arrangements is greater than the number of individuals seeking such 
employment.  Thus, to borrow Hirsch’s (2005, p. 527) argument in respect of part-timers, if 
firms use atypical work as low cost means of adjusting to variable and uncertain demand the 
relatively large supply of atypical workers required may run up against mobility or substitution 
constraints – across labor markets delineated by geography, occupation, and industry – and give 
rise to positive equilibrium wage gaps for atypical workers. 
Some atypical workers in the ‘knowledge economy’ will enjoy high wages because of 
their skill endowments. Workers in high-skill professional, managerial, scientific, and technical 
occupations may turn to alternative work arrangements – contract working and use of 
employment agencies – if firms are unwilling or unable to satisfy knowledge workers. Forde and 
Slater (2005, p. 254) sketch the informational problems that arise in markets for such workers, 
  2noting that temporary employment agencies play “an important role in matching ‘expert’ 
knowledge workers with a series of short-term appointments.” Abraham and Taylor (1996, p. 
399) emphasize technological considerations, noting that contractors may be able to realize 
economies of scale that are unavailable in-house.  
High wages can translate into positive wage gaps for the reasons given by Houseman et 
al. (2003, p. 109): the temporary use of higher-priced temporary labor may give the firm 
additional time to fill permanent vacancies. As before, the argument is that tight labor markets 
reduce the cost of agency temporaries relative to direct hires, and that it may pay to wage 
discriminate between direct hires and temporary agency workers in favor of the latter. Note the 
argument applies to high-skill occupations. The distinction with the low-skill occupations case, 
discussed above, is that the employment of temporary workers is now just that: it is temporary 
and does not perform a screening function leading to their induction of agency workers into the 
regular workforce, even if the goal as before is to obtain more labor without the need to raise the 
wages of incumbents/permanent employees. 
The bottom line is that there a distinction has to be drawn between earnings differences 
and wage gaps. Our task will focus on explaining those differences in earnings between 
alternative work arrangements and regular employment that are attributable to observed and 
unobserved worker characteristics. The residual wage gaps that are left are the starting point for 
separate lines of inquiry not pursued here. Thus, for example, are negative gaps stepping stones 
to permanent employment for key groups in the labor market? Even zero gaps may be checked 
for their consistency with voluntarism in temporary working. Positive wage gaps are of interest 
precisely because of the knowledge economy and the theoretical implication that alternative 
work arrangements are not monolithic. We justify our more restricted focus on the grounds that 
there has been inadequate analysis of earnings differences between atypical and regular workers 
– and especially of differences in compensation – as was also the case until very recently for 
part-time workers (see Hirsch, 2005). Thus, our information on atypical worker compensation is 
either dated (in cross section) or overly restricted in the range of alternative wage arrangements 
examined (in longitudinal data). Accordingly, we seek to update previous findings using 
subsequent waves of the main dataset (the CAEAS) available to researchers in this area, while 
using a different longitudinal dataset (the NLSY) to correct for permanent unobserved 
differences between individuals for a wider range of alternative work arrangements than hitherto. 
  3Our analysis proceeds as follows. To establish the innovations of our own empirical 
approach, we first briefly review the extant evidence on the relative compensation of atypical 
workers. We then introduce the empirical models for earnings determination and employee 
access to health benefits, and also provide information on the two datasets used here, focusing on 
the two compensation indicators and types of atypical work. Next, our findings are presented, 
sequenced by dataset. A short summary concludes. 
 
II.  Existing Research 
Research into alternative work arrangements and their implications for the labor market took off 
in mid 1990s. This increased attention paid atypical work reflects two main developments. First, 
it was not until the 1980s that structural developments in the labor market – such as the 
attenuation of the common law at-will principle (see Autor, 2003) – favored the accelerated 
growth of atypical work. Second, there was understandably little quality data on work 
arrangements that had up to that point played a marginal employment role.  
More recently, analysts have been able to make progress in identifying the impact of 
these arrangements on earnings, inter al., through the identification of workers engaged in the 
Temporary Help Services (THS) industry. And, since 1995, investigation of other types of 
atypical work has been facilitated by the publication of a Contingent and Alternative 
Employment Arrangement Supplement (CAEAS) to the Current Population Survey (CPS). This 
new supplement was administered biennially with the February CPS (in odd years), although 
there was no survey in 2003 and the most recent survey (for 2005) is not yet available. 
(Table 1 near here) 
  A chronological review of the literature on atypical work and its remuneration is 
provided in Table 1. Many of the studies have a narrow reach, cross-tabulating employment in 
the various work arrangements with hourly earnings and group health insurance coverage. The 
study by Cohany (1998) in row 6 of the table is representative. It charts little change in the 
characteristics of those employed in such activities over time (specifically, between the first and 
the second CAEAS), and in comparing their median weekly earnings with those of workers in 
open-ended employment reports that agency temporaries and oncall workers fare particularly 
poorly. For example, the median weekly earnings of agency temporary workers are only two-
thirds of those of regular workers. That said, and again consistent with the findings from the first 
  4CAEAS, independent contractors and contract workers enjoy a wage premium of between fifteen 
and twenty-one percent. 
  Cohany’s cross tabulations also uncover a sharp shortfall in atypical worker fringes. 
Health insurance coverage rates range from a low of seven percent (agency temporary workers) 
to a high of fifty percent (contract workers). And in terms of eligibility to participate in employer 
pension plans, temporaries are once again at the low end (eleven percent) and contractors at the 
high end (forty-six percent) of the scale. By contrast, more than sixty percent of regular workers 
had employer-related health insurance coverage, and more than fifty percent were eligible for a 
pension plan. 
  Differences in the compensation packages associated with the various employment 
arrangements may of course reflect differences in worker characteristics. Thus, for example, 
Cohany reports that atypical workers are younger, have lower educational attainments, and are 
more concentrated in the lower-paid industries and occupations than are regular workers. Using 
two of the same compensation measures as Cohany (viz. wages and health insurance coverage), 
the study by Polivka et al. (2000) in row 8 adopts a multivariate analysis to control for such 
differences in worker characteristics. The authors’ OLS wage regressions put the wage 
disadvantage of agency temporary work at (negative)  five to nine percent.
2 In the light of 
Cohany’s much higher estimates, these cet. par. results suggest that much of the difference in 
wages between temporary agency work and regular work is explained by differences in worker 
characteristics. Yet Polivka et al. find no such attenuation for those workers at the opposite end 
of the earnings spectrum: contractors are still estimated to enjoy a wage premium of twenty-three 
percent, at least in 1997, on par with the results obtained by Cohany. 
  In their separate probit analysis of health insurance, Polivka et al. report a shortfall in 
atypical worker health benefits. In a specification that also includes the worker’s hourly wage, it 
is further reported that its coefficient estimate is positive and well determined, suggesting that 
workers do not trade health insurance access for wages. Expressed differently, poorly-paid 
workers seemingly receive a poor benefits package. That said, the deficit in access to an 
employer’s health insurance was halved once coverage through other means (such as a spouse or 
private insurance) was accounted for. 
  Polivka et al. (2000, p. 77) recognize the limitations of the dataset, noting that 
compensation is influenced by a number of variables not contained in the CAEAS, such as “firm-
  5specific factors, personal tastes, and other unobserved differences that might influence who is in 
these arrangements.”
3 The analyses of Segal and Sullivan (1997, 1998), summarized in rows 4 
and 7 of Table 1, in part anticipated these concerns. Although limited to a comparison of agency 
temporary workers with their counterparts in regular employment, and lacking data on fringes, 
these two studies provide were the first to control for individual unobserved heterogeneity in 
atypical worker earnings determination. Thus, the study in row 7 of the table exploits 
administrative data (rather than the CAEAS), extracting a ten-year sample panel from the 1984-
94 quarterly records contained in the Washington State Unemployment Insurance system and 
identifying temporary employees through their industry affiliation.
4 A comparison of the pooled 
and fixed effects regression estimates suggests that that accounting for permanent unobserved 
individual heterogeneity reduces the earnings deficit of temporary workers by between ten and 
fifteen percent. 
Finally, in a labor market analysis of single-parent female welfare recipients initially 
obtaining atypical work in the temporary help service sector versus other industries, Heinrich, 
Mueser, and Troske (2005) report that this choice does not prejudice their future earnings 
development or continued employment – or for that matter welfare recidivism. Welfare 
recipients beginning work in this sector do earn substantially less than their counterparts in other 
sectors, but this difference does not seem to be the result of unmeasured characteristics.   
Moreover, the low earnings are not permanent: after two years the differences between those 
initially in atypical work are virtually the same as their counterparts who had jobs in other 
industries. This faster earnings growth is shown to be partly the result of atypical workers 
moving to other higher-paying industries. And there is no difference in the proportions of 
workers who do not have a job one year later across industries, including temporary help. The 
bottom line from this study is that welfare recipients obtain opportunities for future advancement 
by working in the temporary help service sector. 
  In the present study, we seek to build and improve upon the existing literature in a 
number of ways.  First, unlike the cet. par. studies of Segal and Sullivan and Heinrich, Mueser, 
and Troske (in rows 4, 7, and 11 of Table 1) each of our two datasets allows us to examine a 
wider set of alternative work arrangements than agency temporary employment alone. Moreover, 
our one truly longitudinal dataset offers a wider array of controls than available in the Current 
  6Population Survey, with more human capital variables as well as proxies for worker ability and 
screening.   
Our second contribution to the analysis of the effect of alternative work arrangement on 
pay is technical in nature. Polivka et al. elect not to use the natural log of a worker’s hourly 
earnings as their dependent variable given certain distributional aspects of the data. More 
precisely, the right-skewness in the earnings of independent contractors prevented them from 
directly estimating the Mincerian semi-logarithmic earnings function that has found such strong 
support in the literature. We adopt the [simplest] technique outlined in Blackburn (2005) that 
takes the variances of the earnings attaching to the various work forms into consideration, 
without abandoning the conventional Mincerian earnings function. 
Finally, we use additional rounds of the CAEAS to test the robustness of the findings of 
Polivka et al. (row 8). In particular, we will seek to establish whether or not their more optimistic 
findings still hold using updated information from the 1999 and 2001 CAEAS.  
 
III.  The Empirical Models  
To assess the impact that atypical work has on the compensation package, we conduct separate 
analyses of (hourly) earnings and (access to) employer-provided health benefits. Ideally, we 
should like to estimate a compensation model in which the dependent variable combines the 
dollar value of the health insurance coverage offered with the worker’s wage. Unfortunately, this 
approach requires data on such things as the quality of the coverage offered and its cost to the 
worker, information not contained in either dataset used here. For its part, a simultaneous 
equations approach was ruled out because we were unable convincingly to identify a variable 
influencing the wage rate but not the probability of being offered health insurance (and vice 
versa). In line with Polivka et al. (2000), however, we will present results for a specification of 
the health-benefits equation that includes a wage argument.  
Wage Determination 
Consider the underlying wage determination model that includes worker ability 
        t=1,2, … T                 (1)  , ' ) , , | ( , , , , , i t i t i i t i t i t i c AWA x c AWA x w E + + = δ β
where wi,t is the (log) wage earned by worker i at time t, xi,t are the corresponding observed 
worker characteristics, AWAi,t is a dummy variable equal to one if a worker i is engaged in an 
  7alternative work arrangement at time t (zero otherwise), and ci is worker ability. The parameter δ 
is the wage differential that is associated with employment in an AWA.   
When equation (1) is estimated by OLS, we have 
                                               (2)  . ' , , , , t i i t i t i t i u c AWA x w + + + = δ β
Absent controls for worker ability, OLS will estimate  
                                             (3)  , ' , , , , t i t i t i t i v AWA x w + + = δ β
where  . Equation (3) will still provide unbiased estimates of δ provided
 However, we will still have to correct the estimates obtained from equation (3) to 
allow for differences in the wage variances observed across the various alternative work 
arrangements. We remit discussion of this issue to the Data Appendix. 
) ( , , t i i t i u c v + =
. 0 ] | [ , , = t i t i x v E
  Related to equation (3) is the random effects linear estimator. It allows us to aggregate 
our three waves of longitudinal data into one pooled sample, assuming the cross-sectional 
differential has not changed over time. Although this estimator does not take unobserved 
individual heterogeneity into account, it will produce unbiased and consistent coefficient 
estimates by allowing for the cross-correlation in the error term that arises when we have 
repeated observations on the same individual. 
  If, as may be hypothesized, ability and employment arrangements are negatively 
correlated, however, the estimate of the wage differential will be biased downward. We can 
remove worker ability from the model using a fixed effects specification that will also be 
estimated alongside equation (3). The fixed effects specification allows for not only individual-
specific intercepts but also year-specific intercepts, as follows 
                                             (4)  , ' , , , , t i t i t i i t t i u AWA x w + + + + = δ β φ α
where αt captures the impact if any that time has on worker earnings and where the individual-
specific intercept  i φ  which controls for any time-invariant unobserved worker characteristics 
such as ability. Any elements of xi,t that are unchanging over time are omitted from (4). 
Employer-Related Health Insurance 
In analyzing the question of access to group health insurance (HI), the correlation between 
ability and employment in an AWA may again bias the estimate of δ. Since the dependent 
variable is now dichotomous, we use the logit model  
  8  (5) 
where HI is observed to be one if HI*>0, zero otherwise. Ability is again represented by ci.  
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If ci is omitted, the fitted model, will yield an estimate of δ that may not be the true differential. 
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Familiarly, equation (7) differs from (6) in including a worker-specific intercept, allowing for a 
consistent estimate of the true value of δ.
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IV.  The Data 
We use two main datasets to estimate the differential attaching to atypical work: the Contingent 
and Alternative Employment Arrangement Supplement (CAEAS) to the Current Population 
Survey (CPS) – as well as the CPS itself – and the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth, 1979 
Cohort (NLSY79). The advantage of the former dataset is its size, given the relatively small 
proportion of workers in certain of the alternative work arrangements. The disadvantage is that 
there is no overlap of households across the supplements, ruling out panel estimation methods. 
Each attribute is reversed in the case of the latter dataset. 
The CAEAS/CPS Wage Data 
We extract one sample from each of the four biennial CAEAS supplements. To allow for the 
inclusion of the 2001 CAEAS
6 and to increase the number of regular workers included in our 
analysis, we link each February CAEAS to the subsequent March basic CPS survey using the 
matching algorithm outlined in Madrian and Lefgren (1999). The CPS collects information on 
industry, occupation, and wages only for those regular workers who are in an outgoing rotation 
group. The CAEAS collects these data for atypical workers without regard to their rotational 
status. We link the two surveys to allow for the inclusion of regular workers for whom the 
crucial wage data is elicited in either February or March. For those regular workers who are 
observed as being in the March outgoing rotation group, we include only those who are observed 
in the February CAEAS/CPS data, who report having the same employer (and being employed) 
in both months, and who have the same activities and occupation in each month. The four cross 
  9sections were also pooled to obtain more precise estimates of the wage differentials attaching to 
the different work arrangements, while accounting for year effects. Note that the four samples 
included only those individuals who were employed in the week prior to their February 
interview. This restriction was imposed because those recorded as unemployed, or as non-
participants, would not report any labor force or wage data.  
The wage variable is the hourly wage rate. It is constructed following the detailed 
procedure outlined in Polivka (1999). Since for some workers the calculation of this hourly wage 
variable involves dividing total weekly earnings by usual hours worked weekly, we omitted 
multiple job-holders. Further, workers either reporting or having an imputed hourly wage rate of 
less than two dollars an hour and more than one hundred and fifty dollars an hour were also 
excluded from the samples. Two other restrictions were the inclusion of only those individuals 
aged twenty-five to sixty-five years at the time of the February survey (to avoid compounding 
different supply responses) and, familiarly, the exclusion of individuals with incomplete 
demographic, industrial, and occupational data. 
Workers are classified according to seven mutually exclusive work arrangements. The 
first two categories pertain to open-ended employment and comprise regular workers and 
screened workers.  Following the convention established in the literature, we initially distinguish 
between five types of atypical workers: agency temporary workers, direct-hire temporary 
workers, oncall workers, contract workers, and independent contractors.   
  Regular workers are those individuals who are directly hired into an open-ended 
employment arrangement using standard interviewing methods, rather than having first been 
screened through an alternative work arrangement. Individuals are classified as screened workers 
if they are currently engaged in open-ended employment and they indicate that immediately 
prior to being employed in this capacity they were employed by the firm in an alternative work 
arrangement (i.e. without any break in employment continuity). We distinguish between the two 
types of open-ended employment to allow for the possibility that initially serving an employer as 
an atypical worker strengthens the bond between employer and employee, and thereby influences 
the wage paid to such workers. 
Returning to the five atypical work categories, agency temporary workers are those 
workers who rely on a third-party, the temporary help service, to secure their employment or 
who receive their paycheck from a temporary help service.
7 Direct-hire temporary workers are 
  10those individuals who are in a job temporarily due to an economic reason and who are hired 
directly by a company rather than through a staffing intermediary. (Note that there is no specific 
question in the supplement relating to direct-hire temporary work; rather, as described by Polivka 
et al. (2000, p.p. 42-43), this synthetic category is constructed from a series of questions in the 
CAEAS.) As a practical matter, we will subsequently aggregate these two temporary categories 
into a single temporary worker composite.
Oncall workers work for a firm on a per-diem or as-needed basis (day laborers are also 
folded into this classification). For their part, contract workers differ from independent 
contractors in that they, like their agency temporary brethren, rely on a third-party to provide 
them with the necessary clients or projects. Following the convention in the literature, we also 
impose the following restrictions for this category: a contract worker needs to have only one 
client and usually work at that client’s workplace. Finally, those we describe as independent 
contractors are self-employed consultants and contractors, responsible for the acquisition of their 
own clients or projects. 
In addition to these five categories we shall also construct some (other) composites, either 
to test the hypothesis that alternative employment hold uniform implications for a worker’s 
earnings or to facilitate comparison with the NLSY79 (see below).  
The NLSY79 Wage Data 
The National Longitudinal Survey of Youth, 1979 Cohort (NLSY79) is the product of repeated 
interviews with individuals aged 14-21 years at the time of the initial interview in 1979 (and 
therefore just beginning to enter the labor market).  
  Four different samples were extracted from the NLSY79 for the wage analysis. First, 
three different cross-sections were created to run the standard OLS regressions, covering 
employees in employment in 1994, 1996, and 1998.  (In 2000, there was no atypical worker 
question.) The restrictions imposed were the same as those applied to the CAEAS/CPS. There 
was one exception: we exclude from the NLSY79 samples those workers who had accumulated 
less than nine weeks’ tenure with their current employer. This restriction is imposed because the 
survey does not report employer-specific information (e.g. the firm’s industry affiliation or the 
worker’s occupational classification) from the respondent unless he or she meets this particular 
service threshold. The wage rate is measured on an hourly basis, but is constructed from 
  11information on earnings and usual hours worked relevant to the frequency at which the 
individual is actually paid. 
Second, for the random and fixed effects estimates, an unbalanced panel was constructed, 
covering all three years used for the cross-sectional analysis and applying same restrictions in 
respect of missing data and the truncation of the wage distribution. This unbalanced panel 
construct does not require that workers be recorded as employed for all three years, only for at 
least two of the three years. It was designed to permit a more precise estimate of δ by including 
as many observations on individuals as possible. 
  Individuals were initially grouped into six possible job categories rather than the eight 
constructed from the CAEAS/CPS. The first two categories of regular workers and screened 
workers are identical and, as before, the distinction is based on the notion that previously 
screened workers may be in a better job match. The same is true for agency temporaries and 
direct-hire temporaries that are subsequently combined into a single temporary worker category. 
But we are unable to distinguish between the two types of contract work, so we will here speak 
of contractors/consultants. The remaining category is the catch-all of other work types, of which 
the most numerous subgroup is self-employment. Other aggregations are discussed in the next 
section. 
Data on Health Insurance 
In discussing compensation, health insurance coverage is more central than the offer of access to 
employer-provided benefits. However, data limitations (not least for identifying instruments) 
lead us here to focus on the latter indicator. Whether or not the employee picks up coverage 
hinges on a number of factors such as it being offered in the first place, the quality of the 
coverage provided, the fraction of the premium paid for by the employer, and the availability of 
other sources of coverage. While extant research does suggest that atypical workers are 
systematically less likely to be covered by health insurance than regular workers (see Table 1), 
we are on safer ground in focusing on the question of whether or not they are offered coverage 
by their employer. Answers to this question can offer guidance as to whether employers are 
using these alternative work arrangements to reduce costs. To the extent that workers are trading 
off health insurance for wages, however, there may no savings to the employer purse. We will 
therefore also need to include the hourly wage as a regressor in modeling access to benefits. If its 
coefficient estimate is negative, this is prima facie evidence of such tradeoffs are being made by 
  12workers. If the point estimate is negative, on the other hand, the suggestion would be that high 
wages and fringes go together, thereby underscoring any finding of negative wage differentials.   
  Using a sequence of questions in the CAEAS, we can identify a worker’s eligibility to 
participate in their employer’s health insurance plan. These questions, however, are asked only 
of workers identified as wage and salaried workers, a restriction that limits our ability to include 
the many independent contractors that are self-employed but which does not otherwise much 
denude the ranks of the remaining alternative work categories vis-à-vis the samples used in the 
wage analysis.
 In short, we are confident in relying on the CAEAS to produce results that are 
reasonable base estimates of access rates to employer-related health insurance plans for these 
atypicals.  
  The health insurance question in the NLSY79 is more direct. Specifically, the worker 
respondent is simply asked whether or not the employer offered access to health insurance 
benefits. The terms of the offer are not identified. In investigating the effects of atypical work on 
employee access to benefits, we will use much the same samples as are employed in our cross-
sectional and fixed effects earnings analyses.  
 
V.  Findings 
Descriptive wage data for the four CAEAS/CPS cross sections and the three waves of NLSY79 
data are given in Tables 2 and 3, respectively. Beginning with the larger CAEAS/CPS samples, 
we see that oncall and temporary workers earn lower wages than do regular workers. For oncall 
workers, the raw wage differential is between (negative) nine and eleven percent, while 
temporary workers earn between ninety and ninety-seven cents on the regular worker dollar. At 
the other end of the wage spectrum are contract workers and independent contractors. Contract 
workers enjoy wages that are seven to fourteen percent higher than open-ended employment. The 
wage premium attaching to independent contracting ranges from nineteen to twenty-eight 
percent. 
(Tables 2 and 3 near here) 
  The earnings of atypical workers vis-à-vis regular workers are directionally the same in 
the NLSY79 data, but as shown in Table 3 the differences are systematically sharper. For 
example, the negative wage differential associated with temporary employment now ranges 
between thirty-five and forty-three percent, whereas workers in contracting/consulting earn a 
  13premium of between twenty-two and forty-four percent. Across both datasets, however, there is 
only a weak suggestion of a wage premium accruing to those who first worked for their 
employer as an atypical worker.  Relative to non-screened regular counterparts, screened workers 
earn at best four percent more (Table 2) and, at worst, four percent less (Table 3).  
  Work diaries maintained by the NLSY79 respondents provide us with some additional 
human capital controls not found in the CAEAS/CPS data. Specifically, we have data on a 
worker’s (cumulative) general labor market experience as well as his/her tenure on the current 
job.
8 Moreover, we can estimate a standardized measure of the number of jobs held by 
individuals by dividing the reported total number of jobs held by (cumulative) general labor 
market experience. This standardized number of jobs variable can be also viewed as an inverse 
proxy for the attractiveness of the worker to an employer. Descriptive information on each of 
these variables is provided in Table 4 for the 1994 wave of the NLSY79. Not surprisingly 
workers in atypical work arrangements have substantially less tenure with their employers than 
do regular workers. In terms of general labor market experience, it would appear that 
contractors/consultants have been employed slightly longer than regular workers. And, despite 
their having spent fewer years in employment, temporary workers have held more jobs on 
average than those engaged in open-ended employment. 
  We next turn to the multivariate cross-section results, beginning with those for the larger 
CAEAS/CPS samples. We report (albeit without further ado) the results of the semi-logarithmic 
model in Table 5.
9 As was flagged earlier, the coefficients produced by this model may not be 
consistent estimates of the actual wage differential. For dichotomous variables, such as the 
alternative work arrangements, differences in the dispersion of the dependent variable (in this 
case the natural log of the wage rate) may correlate with the model’s error term. Given this error 
dependence, it would be improper to rely on the often used convention of subtracting one from 
the exponentiation of the (biased) coefficient estimate to provide estimates of the cet. par. effect 
of atypical employment on earnings. (For the formal argument and evidence on the need for this 
correction, see the Data Appendix). Accordingly, in Table 6 we report estimates of the wage 
differential that have been corrected for this error dependence using the procedure outlined in 
Blackburn (2005). To obtain the differential in percentage terms, one now simply has to multiply 
the estimates in Table 6 by one hundred. 
  14  Note further that for each of the CAEAS/CPS cross sections, we estimate two 
specifications. The first specification – reported in the odd-numbered columns – uses the full 
sample of workers in each cross section. The second specification – reported in the even-
numbered columns – excludes those workers who had a wage component, such as hourly or 
weekly earnings, allocated to them by the CPS. These allocations occur where a worker does not 
provide his or her wage information. As shown by Hirsch and Schumacher (2004), the use of 
allocated workers may cause the estimates of the wage differential to be biased toward zero. 
When the CPS allocates an earnings component to a worker, it does so using four characteristics 
(age, gender, education, and occupation) to impute that individual’s earnings. Although these 
variables are good predictors of an individual’s wage rate, Hirsch and Schumacher show that 
coefficients estimated for those characteristics upon which the CPS does not rely to allocate 
earnings, such as atypical work, will be biased when analyzing workers with allocated wage 
components. For example, given the fairly small number of workers engaged in oncall work, we 
will understate the (negative) effect that this work form has on earnings given the high 
probability that the CPS will allocate an  oncall worker the wage rate earned by a regular worker 
by the CPS were we to include allocated workers in the sample. 
(Tables 5 and 6 near here) 
Focusing therefore on the differentials reported in Table 6, we see that controlling for 
worker characteristics slightly increases the wage penalty attached to temporary employment. 
For the pooled sample in columns (9) and (10), we see that the linear estimator places the 
negative wage differential attaching to temporary employment at around six percent. The F-tests 
at the foot of Table 5 reject the possibility that agency temping and direct-hire temping have the 
same implications for workers earnings. When we estimate separate coefficients for the two 
types of temporary employment, for the pooled sample (and again correcting for error 
dependence) we find that agency temping reduces a worker’s earnings by fully sixteen percent. 
Employment as a direct-hire temporary worker, on the other hand, serves to reduce wages by 
only four percent vis-à-vis open-ended employment. Yet we choose to aggregate these two work 
forms for two reasons. We do so first to maintain consistency with the results for the NLSY79 
where aggregation of these two categories was not contraindicated. Second, estimates obtained 
from the CAEAS/CPS for a sample designed to match the NLSY79 age cohort (i.e. including 
only those workers aged 30 to 35) failed to reject the hypothesis that employment as an agency 
  15temporary played the same role in earnings determination as employment as a direct-hire 
temporary. (Results available from the authors upon request). 
Returning to the results for the other alternative work arrangements in Table 6, we see 
that the negative implications of oncall work for a worker’s hourly earnings disappear in all but 
one cross section. Only in 1997, then, do we see a statistically significant negative wage 
differential – of around three to four percent. Recall that our simple cross tabulations in Table 2 
suggested that engaging in oncall work rather than open-ended employment reduced the 
individual’s wages by nine to eleven percent. In other words, more than one-half of the raw wage 
difference is explained by differences in the observed characteristics of workers selecting oncall 
work. 
We observe a similar attenuation of the simple positive wage premiums associated with 
both types of contract work (cf. Table 2). Again focusing on the results obtained from the pooled 
sample in columns (9) and (10), we see that electing to work as a contract worker serves to 
increase the worker’s earnings in the range ten to thirteen percent. The corresponding differential 
for independent contractors is fifteen to sixteen percent. Across all cross sections, we fail to find 
any evidence that being screened initially as an atypical worker before being offered regular 
employment has any effect on the worker’s wage.  
Two final observations should be made. First, the notion of there being a composite 
atypical work category is contradicted. As shown in the hypothesis tests at the foot of Table 5, 
different work arrangements play distinct roles in earnings determination. Second, note that 
excluding those workers with allocated wage components does not materially affect the 
estimated wage differentials. 
(Tables 7 and 8 near here)  
Turning now to the analysis of the NLSY79 earnings data, we again report two sets of 
results – for the semi-logarithmic specification in Table 7,
10 and for the correction suggested by 
Blackburn (2005) in Table 8. Again focusing on the adjusted differentials, we find that the 
negative wage differential associated with temporary employment is generally well-determined 
and between five and fifteen percent. Taking into consideration the characteristics of those 
engaging in temporary employment nearly halves the raw estimates of the differential (cf. Table 
3). The reduction in the wage premium of contracting/consulting workers is more modest. 
Across the three NLSY79 samples, the linear estimator places the higher wages enjoyed by 
  16contractors and consultants at between twenty-one and thirty-six percent. There is now some 
slight indication that screened workers earn more than their counterparts hired directly into 
regular employment. At best, they enjoy a four percent wage premium and, at worse, suffer a 
three percent wage penalty. 
As was the case in the CAEAS/CPS data, we find no support for the use of a composite 
atypical work argument. The results contained at the foot of Table 7 clearly show that temporary 
employment (agency and direct hire temps) has a significantly different effect on worker 
earnings from contracting/consulting and other work types, Even if the two categories of 
temporary employment can be aggregated. It would be inappropriate, therefore, to speak of an 
aggregate across all these categories.  
Except for tenure, the additional human capital controls found in the NLSY79 data 
explain very little of the variation in wages across workers. We report these coefficient estimates 
in Table 7 because the continuous variables are unaffected by the error dependence correction. 
Greater firm-specific human capital, as measured by tenure, significantly increases earnings. 
Each year spent with an employer adds to a worker’s earnings in the range of 3.5 to 4.1 percent. 
Although of the expected signs, the coefficients estimated for both general labor market 
experience and the number of jobs held by an individual are generally poorly determined. 
Unique to the NLSY79 is the availability of information on the respondent’s Armed 
Forces Qualification Test (AFQT) test scores. The AFQT is a set of standardized tests used by 
the military to assess the abilities and knowledge of recruits in the following areas: general 
science, arithmetic reasoning, word knowledge, paragraph comprehension, numerical operations, 
coding ability, auto/shop knowledge, knowledge of mathematics, mechanical comprehension, 
and electronics information. We formed four separate categories for worker ability. Thus, for 
example, we combined the scores on the word knowledge and paragraph comprehension tests. 
The resulting aggregate score was then regressed on a set of age and education dummies at the 
time the test was administered, which were allowed to have nonlinear effects. The residuals from 
this regression were used as a proxy for a worker’s verbal ability in the OLS wage regression. 
Measures of mathematical ability,  coding ability, and the catch-all of practical ability were 
derived in a similar manner.
11
(Table 9 near here) 
  17The results of the OLS regressions including these observed ability measures are given in 
Tables 9. For expositional convenience, we report only the corrected estimates. Although coding 
and math ability are generally significant in explaining the variation in wages across workers, 
they do not materially alter the point estimates attaching to the various work forms. In line with 
the results produced in Table 8, we still arrive at an estimate of the wage penalty associated with 
temporary employment of between six to fourteen percent when we include these ability proxies, 
while the contracting/consulting wage premium is twenty-one to thirty-four percent (Table 10). 
The virtual absence of any role for measured ability in influencing differentials for atypical work 
may well mean that standardized testing does not control for certain key aspects of worker 
heterogeneity (such as motivation and labor force attachment) – or, in the limit, do other than 
confirm the individual’s ability to take the relevant tests.  An alternative possibility is that ability 
and employment in an atypical work arrangement are not negatively correlated. 
  We next turn to panel estimators for further consideration of whether employment in an 
alternative work arrangement and unobserved factors (including ability) are correlated. As noted 
earlier, two such panel data estimation techniques are employed. As a baseline, the random 
effects linear estimator provides us with more precise estimates of the wage differential attaching 
to atypical work in the cross section by pooling the three waves of NLSY79 data into a single 
sample. Since this specification does not take into consideration any bias that is induced by 
unobserved individual heterogeneity, we also employ the fixed effects linear specification. We 
present results correcting for error-dependence and also allow the effect of atypical employment 
on earnings to differ by gender.   
(Table 10 near here) 
The summary random effects least squares results obtained from the full sample of 
workers given in the first column of Table 10 indicate that temporary workers have wages that 
are seventeen percent lower than those of regular workers, while contracting/consulting workers 
enjoy a premium of thirty-one percent. As can be seen from the fourth column of the table, 
however, the wage penalty (premium) attaching to temporary work (contracting/consulting) 
worker are sharply reduced in magnitude after we control for unobserved individual 
heterogeneity. Now the wage penalty for associated with temporary employment is only some 
five percent – a reduction of more than twelve percentage points. The wage premium for 
contracting/consulting work falls by eleven percentage points to 20 percent. 
  18The corresponding results for male workers are provided in the second and fifth columns 
of Table 10. In line with the results obtained for the full sample, the wage penalty for temporary 
employment is reduced after unobserved heterogeneity is taken into consideration: from about 
(negative) twenty-seven percent to eighteen percent. Interestingly, there is almost no attenuation 
in the wage premium for contracting/consulting work over regular employment, which is steady 
at around thirty percent. However, the results for females in the third and final columns of the 
table are very different from those of males. The negative and positive differentials found for 
female temporary workers and female contractors/consultants, respectively, in the baseline 
random effects specification are reversed in the fixed effects estimation. It seems that female 
temporary workers have unobserved characteristics that lead to lower earnings, and conversely 
for female contractors/consultants. In the former case, these characteristics most likely include a 
preference for flexible employment by reason of family or household demands as well as 
marginal attachment to the labor force. The fixed effects results would suggest that this group of 
females actually fare better when employed in temporary jobs than regular work. As far as 
female contractors/consultants are concerned, the modest negative differential observed in fixed 
effects can be taken as more indicative of their being of higher ability. If higher ability females 
are disproportionately opting for contracting/consulting work, then one would expect to find an 
upward bias in the cross-section estimate of the wage effect. 
(Tables 11 and 12 near here) 
We turn in conclusion to the issue of access to health insurance on the job, which may 
clearly benefit the worker even if the employer does not directly (or indirectly) contribute to its 
cost by virtue of the lower premiums charged for group insurance. Descriptive information on 
employer-related health insurance access rates from the CAEAS/CPS and the NLSY79 are 
reported in Tables 11 and 12. Across both datasets, it is evident that those in alternative work 
arrangements are less likely to be eligible for health insurance than are regular workers. From the 
CAEAS/CPS, we see that forty-five to sixty-one percent of temporary workers have access to 
employer-related health insurance. Independent contractors have the lowest access rates of 
twenty-one to thirty-four percent. Of the four types of atypical work identified in the CAEAS, 
contract workers seem to fare the best, with fifty-three to sixty-percent of them being eligible for 
employer-related health insurance. Note, however, that more than eighty percent of regular 
workers have access to these benefits. Similar but again sharper disparities between atypical 
  19workers and those in regular employment are found in the NLSY79. 
(Table 13 near here) 
  We now turn to multivariate analysis to disentangle the impact of worker characteristics 
and work arrangement on the probability being offered health insurance coverage. Two sets of 
logit estimates are provided, with and without the worker’s hourly wage. As noted earlier, we 
include the wage variable to test for the possibility that workers may be trading access to health 
insurance for higher wages. The results for the CAEAS/CPS are reported in Table 13. As can be 
seen, the point estimates for the four types of atypical work are generally well-determined and 
negatively signed. Focusing on the results obtained from the pooled sample, we see that 
temporary workers are twelve to eighteen percentage points less likely than are regular workers 
to be eligible to participate in an employer’s insurance plan. Independent contractors have the 
largest deficit vis-à-vis open-ended employment. The reduction in their likelihood of being 
extended access to benefits ranges between thirty-one and thirty-nine percentage points. On net, 
controlling for observed characteristics almost halves the raw deficits in access as between open-
ended employment and the various types of atypical work. And consistent with the results 
obtained by Polivka et al. (2000), we find no evidence that workers are trading health insurance 
access for higher earnings. Rather, we find that the probability of access to employer-related 
health insurance benefits is increasing in the wage. In other words, the suggestion is that low-
paying jobs also attract lower fringes. 
(Table 14 near here) 
  A similar attenuation of the differences in access to benefits as between atypical workers 
on the one hand and those in open-ended employment on the other is found for the NLSY79, 
once we control for the characteristics of workers selecting into these alternative work 
arrangements. The logit estimates are given in Table 14. It can be seen that, relative to regular 
workers, temporary workers are seventeen to twenty-one percentage points less likely to be 
eligible to participate in an employer’s health insurance plan. For their part, 
contractors/consultants are twenty-five to thirty-seven percentage points less likely to have 
access than regular workers. 
  Across both datasets, there is now some evidence to favor the argument that initially 
serving an employer in an atypical arrangement prior to being hired as a regular worker may 
result in higher compensation. That is to say, relative to their non-screened counterparts, 
  20screened workers are significantly more likely to have access to employer-provided health 
insurance benefits: four to ten percentage points more in the CAEAS/CPS, and six percentage 
points more in the NLSY79 (see the first row entries in Tables 13 and 14, respectively).
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 (Table 15 near here) 
  Finally, we turn to our panel estimates. As was case with the random effects linear 
estimator, the random effects logit model allows us to aggregate the three NLSY79 waves to 
provide more robust estimates. And we again rely on the fixed effects specification to 
statistically control for unobserved heterogeneity. We also run separate equations for male and 
female workers to examine whether the effects of atypical work on access to health insurance 
benefits differ by gender. These panel estimates are reported in Table 15. As can be seen, the 
samples used to estimate the fixed effects logit are considerably smaller than those for the 
random effects specification. This is because identification of the effect of atypical work on 
access to benefits using fixed effects requires not only a change in eligibility but also in atypical 
work status over the three year sample period. Comparing the all-worker results, fixed effects 
estimation produces smaller effects throughout than does random effects. Before taking account 
of unobserved heterogeneity, temporary workers (contractors/consultants) are a little more than 
thirty-five (fifty) percentage points less likely to be eligible to participate in an employer’s health 
insurance plan. After controlling for unobserved heterogeneity, the estimate of the reduced 
access of temporaries (contractors/consultants) is twenty (twenty-three) percentage points. On 
this occasion, however, disaggregating by gender yields few surprises. Generally, although 
women are somewhat less likely to be eligible than males, there is the same hierarchy in the 
effect of alternative work arrangement on access to benefit and much the same reduction in the 
disparity by atypical work arrangement once account is taken of unobserved individual 
heterogeneity.    
 
VI.  Conclusions 
Our analysis extends prior research into the effects of atypical employment on compensation. 
Thus, we have provided both cross section and panel estimates for a full array of atypical work 
forms, corrected the earnings function estimates for skewness in the earnings distribution, and 
incorporated two additional rounds of data of the CAEAS. With these improvements we can 
confirm the broad findings of Polivka et al. (1999) and Segal and Sullivan (1997, 1998). That is 
  21to say, much of the differences in compensation packages associated with atypical work and 
open-ended employment can be explained by taking into consideration both observed and 
unobserved differences in the types of workers filling these alternative work arrangements.  
The wage results obtained from the CAEAS/CPS data would imply that atypical work is 
not a monolithic entity. Temporary employment negatively influences a worker’s wage to the 
tune of six percent, while independent contractors enjoy a fifteen to sixteen percent wage 
premium. Using pooled data from the NLSY79 we find that the negative (positive) wage 
differential attaching to temporary employment (contract work) is seventeen (thirty-one) percent. 
But there is considerable diminution in the absolute magnitude of each differential once we 
control for unobserved characteristics as ability, motivation, or lifestyle preferences: the negative 
differential for temporary work falls to 5 percent and the advantage associated with contract 
work declines to twenty percent. 
When we allow for atypical work to differ in its implications by gender, we find only a 
mild attenuation in the wage effects of engaging in temporary and contracting/consulting work in 
the case of males: for example, both the random and fixed effects linear models produce a wage 
premium for contracting/consulting of about thirty percent. However, we see a clear 
overstatement of the wage penalty (premium) attaching to temporary (contracting/consulting) 
work in the case of females. Our fixed effects estimates suggest that females are actually 
positively rewarded for engaging in temporary work to the tune of thirteen percent while yet 
confronting a modest wage penalty (of around three percent) if employed as a contractor or 
consultant. 
  Balancing these generally more optimistic results, however, is our finding of relatively 
large disparities in the access of atypical workers to employer-related health insurance benefits. 
While we find that the magnitude of the deficit is nearly halved when we control for worker 
differences, even the smallest estimate – that obtained from a fixed effects model – estimates that 
temporary and contract workers are more than twenty percentage points less likely to be have 
access to this fringe benefit than are regular workers. Taken in conjunction with the results from 
an earlier literature, this reduced access to health benefits flags a potential source of concern and 
merits further study.  
  22Endnotes 
1We do not consider here wage gaps associated with the operation of segmented labor markets 
because of the absence of an anchor, or permanent worker analogue. 
 
2Noting a large degree of skewness in earnings, particularly for contractors, Polivka, Cohany, 
and Hipple (2000) use hourly wages rather than the natural log of the hourly wage in their OLS 
regressions. In our calculations above, we estimate the percentage differential by taking the 
dollar estimate from the authors’ OLS regressions and then expressing this value as a percentage 
of mean of reported regular worker earnings in either 1995 or 1997. 
 
3On the issue of firm-specific factors in benefits determination, see Lautsch (2003). 
4As noted by Segal and Sullivan (1998), one key advantage in using the unemployment 
insurance administrative data over the CPS is that the source of the information on industrial 
affiliation is the paycheck-issuing entity (for temporary workers, this would be the THS agency). 
A concern with worker-reported data (as with the outgoing rotations of the CPS) is that agency 
temporary workers may cite the industrial affiliation of their client firm rather than that of their 
true employer – the temporary agency. In such cases, researchers will fail to identify temporary 
workers. 
 
5One technical note concerning the fixed effects logit is warranted. To identify the effect that 
atypical work has on access to health insurance, an observed change is required in not only the 
dependent variable, but also in work arrangement. This restriction will limit the number of 
useable observations for this analysis. 
 
6In 2001, due to a CPS programming error, the survey was not administered to the outgoing 
rotation group. For the 2001 sample, we include only those regular workers who are identified in 
both the February CAEAS and the outgoing rotation group in March. 
 
7This last condition led to the inclusion of the miniscule fraction of the agency’s workers who are 
engaged in open-ended employment and are paid by the temporary help service. As noted by 
Houseman and Polivka (2000), a 1989 Industry Wage Survey indicates that these workers 
comprise only 3.2 percent of an agency’s total employment. 
 
8The NLSY79 gives the actual number of weeks that a respondent has been employed since 
entering the survey, as well as the actual number of weeks employed with the current employer. 
This allows us to control for general human capital using actual work experience, and firm-
specific training using a worker’s tenure with the employer. 
 
9Full OLS results for the pooled CAEAS sample are provided in Appendix Table 1. 
 
10Full OLS results for the 1998 NLSY79 sample are provided in Appendix Table 2. 
 
11Construction of the mathematical ability measure first required that we sum across the scores 
for the respondent’s arithmetic reasoning, knowledge of mathematics, and numerical operations 
tests. In similar vein, practical ability was derived from adding the component scores for general 
  23science, auto/shop knowledge, mechanical comprehension, and electronics information. Only the 
coding measure involved no initial summation. 
 
12As was the case for wage compensation, the inclusion of proxies for a worker’s ability does 
little to affect the point estimates of the probability that an atypical worker will be eligible to 
access an employer’s insurance plan. The proxies themselves are imprecisely estimated and fail 
to explain the differences in worker access rates. 
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  26 DATA APPENDIX 
The standard convention in calculating the cet. par. wage differential involves the regression of 
the log wage on a vector of worker characteristics, x.  In using the log wage, rather than the wage 
in level terms, we are assuming that the underlying wage determination model is 
, ] , | [
i i AWA x
i i i e AWA x w E
φ β+ ′ =                        ( 1 )  
where wi is the wage rate earned by worker i,  xi is a vector of worker i’s (observed) 
characteristics, and AWAi is a variable equal to one if the worker is engaged in an alternative 
work arrangement (zero otherwise).  The estimated model is, therefore,  
  , ] , | ) [log( i i i i i i AWA x AWA X w E ε φ β + + ′ =                    (2) 
where  i ε  is a standard error term.  This model has strong theoretical support and provides 
consistent estimates of β  and φ  if  . 0 ] | [ = i i w E ε   However, it may not yield consistent 
estimates of the differential attached to atypical work. 
  After estimating (2), the differential attaching to, say, atypical employment would be 
obtained via 
                                (3)  . 1 − =
φ δ e AWA
As shown in Blackburn (2005), this approach is flawed if  
  .                             (4)  ] 0 | [ ] 1 | [ = ≠ = i i AWA e E AWA e E
i i ε ε
This possibility can be tested by taking the residuals from the estimation of equation (2), 
squaring them, and then regressing the squared terms on the same elements of Xi and AWAi as 
follows 
. ] [ 2 1
2 AWA x E i i λ λ ε + ′ =                        ( 5 )  
If the estimation of equation (5) yields statistically significant estimates of  2 λ , then (3) will not 
yield a consistent estimate of  AWA δ ; specifically, a positive (negative) coefficient estimate of  2 λ  
would imply that any estimates of  AWA δ  using (3) are over- (under-) stated. 
Blackburn shows that a more appropriate estimate of  AWA δ  is 
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where the variance of δ  is computed as 
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  The table below shows the results of fitting equation (5) for both datasets. It indicates that 
the use of (6) is required: 
 
OLS Estimates of Error Dependence (Dependent Variable: Squared Error Term) 
 
(a) Pooled CAEAS/CPS data 
Screened -0.036***  Temporary  0.075*** 
workers (0.010)  workers (0.006) 
 
Oncall 0.140*** Contract  0.025 





(b)1998 NLSY79 data 
Screened -0.034*  Temporary  -0.021 
workers (0.020)  workers (0.042) 
 
Contractors/ 0.225***  Other  work -0.088 
consultants (0.038)  types  (0.071) Table 1: Selected U.S. Studies Examining the Effect of Alternative Employment on Worker Compensation 
Study      Data Methodology Compensation 
measure(s)  Work form(s) examined  Findings 
1. Hipple and 
Stewart (1996) 
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Median weekly earnings of agency temporary 
workers ($290) and oncall workers ($386) are 
lower than are those of regular workers ($480).  
Contract employment ($512) and independent 
contracting ($518) carry a premium.  All forms 
of non-traditional employment offer lower 
benefits in terms of employer-related health 
insurance and pension coverage.  Among 
agency temporary workers only 6% have 
health insurance from the employer and just 
7% have pension coverage.  The corresponding 
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Atypical work is associated with lesser 
experience: temporary workers spent a lower 
fraction of the weeks prior to their job in 
employment (46%) as compared with regular 
workers (76%). The wages of temporary 
workers are between 65 and 74% percent of 
those earned by regular workers. 
3. Nollen (1997)  1984 Industry Wage 










temporary (i.e. regular) 
employment. 
In 1994 agency temporaries earned $7.74 per 
hour, versus $11.94 for non-temporaries. In 
both 1984 and 1994, the differential attaching 
to temporary work approximated 34%, some of 
which is allied to the disproportionate number 
of temporaries concentrated in low-paying 
occupations such as clerical or laborer 
positions. 














Agency temporaries earned 78 cents on the 
permanent-worker dollar in 1993. Cross-
section OLS estimates controlling for 
demographic, industrial, and occupation 
differences are in the range -8 to -14%. Fixed 
effects regressions point to a negative 
differential of just 3%, suggesting that much of 
the wage difference is attributable to 
unobserved worker heterogeneity. 
  29Study Data  Methodology  Compensation 
measure(s)  Work form(s) examined  Findings 
5. Blank (1998)  1995 and 1996 
March Current 
Population Surveys. 
Cross tabulations.   Hourly earnings, 
employer-provided 
health insurance 
coverage, access to 
pension coverage, 
and average weekly 
hours. 
Agency temporary workers, 
regular workers. 
On average agency temporaries work 36 hours 
per week, as compared with 43 hours for 
regular workers, and receive hourly wages that 
are 70% of those paid to regular workers. 
Some 24% of temporary workers have health 
insurance from their employer as compared 
with 67% in the case of regular workers; and 
less than 10% of temporaries have pensions 
compared to 54% of regular workers. 
6. Cohany (1998)  1997 CAEAS/CPS.  Cross tabulations.   Median weekly 
earnings, health 
insurance coverage 




Agency temporary, oncall 




Findings similar to Hipple and Stewart (1996) 
in row 1.  Agency temporary workers earn the 
least ($329 per week) when compared with 
regular workers ($510), and oncall work pays 
85 cents on the regular-employee dollar. Both 
groups are younger, and more likely to be 
female or a minority member than are regular 
workers. For their part, contract workers and 
independent contractors have median weekly 
earnings of $619 and $587, although neither 
achieves the same rate of employer-related 
health insurance or pension coverage as do 
regular workers. 













and quarterly hours 








The cross-section findings point to a well-
determined negative earnings differential for 
agency temporary work in excess of 30%. But 
controlling for worker-specific fixed effects 




1995 and 1997 
CAEAS/CPS. 
OLS estimation and 














Cross tabulations of hourly wages yield results 
similar to Cohany (1998) in row 6. After 
taking into consideration differences in worker 
characteristics, the differential attached to 
agency temporary (contracting) work is 
estimated to be -5% (23%) in 1997. Fewer than 
1 in 5 agency temporaries have access to 
employer’s health insurance plan, compared 
with more than 4 out of 5 regular workers. 
Benchmarked to regular workers, the probit 
analysis indicates no attenuation for this group. 
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measure(s)  Work form(s) examined  Findings 
 
Study


















Temporary workers offered training were paid 
2 to 3% lower wages than those not given 
training. Firm fixed effects results are of a 
negative differential in excess of 5%. 
10. Houseman 
(2001) 
1999 CAEAS/CPS.   Cross tabulations.  Employer-provided 
health insurance 
coverage, and access 
to pension coverage 
from employer. 
Agency temporary, direct-
hire temporary, oncall and 
contract workers, 
independent contractors, 
and regular workers. 
Of those who have health insurance, agency 
temporaries are the least likely to have 
obtained this coverage from their employer 
(9%). Some 60% of insured contract workers 
acquired that insurance from their employer, 
roughly on a par with regular workers (64%). 
Across all types of atypical work, pension 
coverage is sharply lower than in regular 
employment; for example, only 7% of agency 
temporary workers have this benefit compared 





for female recipients 





Needy Families in  
Missouri (1993-97) 
and North Carolina 
(1997). 
Cross tabulations 
plus OLS earnings 
estimates, with 
selection argument 
for job choice 
(derived from a 






(the current and 
subsequent earnings 
of welfare recipients 
in the temporary 
help sector are 
compared with other 
employed welfare 
recipients in other 
industries). The 
study also examines 
employment and 
welfare dynamics. 
Welfare recipients in 
temporary help service 
industry and other 
industries.   
Welfare recipients in temporary jobs (defined 
by sector) receive lower earnings than their 
counterparts in other jobs initially, but that 
after 2 years their earnings are virtually 
identical to those received in other jobs. This 
implied faster earnings growth arises in part 
because workers in the temporary help industry 
are more likely to move into higher paying 
industries over time. Accordingly, temporary 
workers have appreciably better prospects than 
those who are not holding jobs initially (and 
vis-à-vis those who held jobs in other sectors 
they are no more likely to be unemployed or 
have appreciably higher rates of welfare 
recidivism). Table 2:  Mean Hourly Wage Rates by Employment Arrangement, CAEAS/CPS Data 
 
  1995 1997 1999 2001 
 
Regular  13.49 14.04 15.57 17.37 
workers  (8.14) (8.00) (9.67)  (10.80) 
 
Screened  13.46 13.92 16.25 17.49 
workers  (7.01) (6.46) (9.37)  (10.53) 
 
Temporary  12.09 13.58 14.47 16.42 
workers  (9.24) (10.57) (11.95) (12.74) 
 
Oncall  12.14 12.46 14.24 15.80 
workers  (11.50) (10.89) (12.89) (15.29) 
 
Contract  14.39 15.36 17.15 19.85 
workers (10.09)  (9.42)  (9.03)  (12.01) 
 
Independent  16.12 18.00 19.53 21.08 
contractors  (12.79) (15.22) (16.67) (17.74) 
 
n  23,655 22,286 23,627  9,486 
 
Note:  Standard deviations in parentheses. 
 
Table 3:  Mean Hourly Wage Rates by Employment Arrangement, NLSY79 Data 
 
 1994  1996  1998 
 
Regular  13.57 14.94 16.34 
workers (9.43)  (11.22)  (11.80) 
 
Screened  13.01 15.29 15.67 
workers  (7.56) (9.73) (9.92) 
 
Temporary  8.85 9.59 9.58 
workers  (4.50) (5.36) (4.89) 
 
Contractors/ 16.49 21.29 23.53 
consultants  (20.38) (19.03) (23.12)   
 
Other  work  19.79 19.92 17.78 
types (15.85)  (17.82)  (6.91) 
 
n 5,551  5,702  5,666 
 
Note:  See note to Table 2. 
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Table 4: Labor Market Experience by Employment Arrangement, 1994 NLSY79 Data 
 
 Regular  Screened  Temporary  Contractors/  Other  work 
  workers workers workers consultants  types 
 
Experience  13.03 12.56 10.27 12.69 13.11 
(in  years)  (3.33) (3.24) (3.95) (3.77) (3.58) 
 
Tenure  5.24 5.01 1.31 3.96 2.11 
(in  years)  (4.52) (4.13) (2.22) (3.73) (2.36) 
 
Jobs  0.78 0.85 1.58 0.97 1.08 
(standardized)  (0.56) (0.57) (1.26) (0.55) (0.54) 
no. of jobs) 
n 4,910  427  98  86  30 
Note: See note to Table 2. 
 
 Table 5:  OLS Cross-Section and Pooled Regression Estimates of Atypical Worker Wage Differentials,  CAEAS/CPS Data 
(dependent variable: log hourly wage) 
 
  1995 1997 1999 2001  Pooled 
Variable (1)  (2)
1  (3) (4)  (5) (6)  (7) (8)  (9)  (10) 
 
Screened 0.009    0.018  0.023  0.003 -0.003  -0.011 -0.008  0.008  0.008 
workers (0.016)    (0.015)  (0.017)  (0.017)  (0.018) (0.030)  (0.033) (0.009)  (0.011) 
 
Temporary -0.119***    -0.080***  -0.088***  -0.107***  -0.124*** -0.099***  -0.107*** -0.101***  -0.106*** 
workers (0.013)    (0.012)  (0.012)  (0.013)  (0.013) (0.026)  (0.026) (0.007)  (0.009) 
 
Oncall  -0.070***    -0.076*** -0.088***  -0.075*** -0.074*** -0.107*  -0.106*  -0.077***  -0.084*** 
workers (0.025)    (0.024)  (0.025)  (0.027)  (0.028) (0.058)  (0.057) (0.014)  (0.018) 
 
Contract  0.047    0.112*** 0.107**  0.118*** 0.113***  0.033  0.027  0.084*** 0.101*** 
workers (0.033)    (0.042)  (0.044)  (0.037)  (0.039) (0.085)  (0.087) (0.021)  (0.028) 
 
Independent  -0.021    0.038**  0.037** 0.002 -0.008  -0.019 -0.027  0.002  0.007 
contractors (0.014)    (0.015)  (0.016)  (0.015) (0.015)  (0.029) (0.029)  (0.008) (0.010) 
 
Allocated?  Y    Y N  Y N  Y N  Y N 
 
n  23,655    22,286 18,521  23,627 18,813 9,486  7,398 79,054  44,732 
Adjusted R
2  0.31    0.31 0.32  0.32 0.32  0.33 0.34  0.32 0.33 
 
Notes: Huber-White standard errors to correct for heteroskedasticity in parentheses. 
***, **, * denote significance at the .01, .05, and .10 levels, respectively. 
1In 1995, the CPS does not provide us with a means of distinguishing between, allocated and nonallocated earnings. 
Additional controls are age (and age
2), gender and ethnicity, a dummy variable equal to one if married (zero otherwise), an interaction term between gender (being female) and marital status, six educational dummies (the 
omitted category is no high school diploma), a dummy variable equal to one if residing in an urban area (zero otherwise), four regional dummies (the omitted category is residing in the Northeast), ten industry dummies (the 
omitted category is agriculture/fishing/forestry), and six occupational dummies (the omitted category is manager). 
 
Using the results obtained from the full samples, F-tests were conducted to determine the following restrictions, with test statistic ρ and p-value (in parenthesis) reported below: 
 
   1995    1997    1999    2001    Pooled 
βAGENCY TEMP =βDIRECT-HIRE TEMP:  ρ=20.89 (p=0.000)    ρ=  7.62 (p=0.006)    ρ=  6.80 (p=0.009)    ρ=0.09 (p=0.760)    ρ=33.60 (p=0.000) 
βCW=βIC:     ρ=  3.64 (p=0.057)    ρ=  2.83 (p=0.092)    ρ=  8.88 (p=0.003)    ρ=0.36 (p=0.561)    ρ=14.21 (p=0.000) 
  βTEMP=βOC=βCW=βIC:   ρ=13.63 (p=0.000)    ρ=18.31 (p=0.000)    ρ=18.31 (p=0.000)    ρ=2.03 (p=0.108)    ρ=48.54 (p=0.000)
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Table 6:  Corrected OLS Cross-Section and Pooled Regression Estimates of Atypical Worker Wage Differentials,  CAEAS/CPS Data 
 
  1995 1997 1999 2001  Pooled 
Variable (1)  (2)
1  (3) (4)  (5) (6)  (7) (8)  (9)  (10) 
 
Screened -0.015    -0.005  0.004  -0.013 -0.020  -0.009 -0.007  -0.010 -0.007 
workers (0.013)    (0.012)  (0.014)  (0.013)  (0.015) (0.021)  (0.024) (0.007)  (0.009) 
 
Temporary -0.089***    -0.043***  -0.046***  -0.059***  -0.074*** -0.047***  -0.052*** -0.062***  -0.059*** 
workers (0.007)    (0.007)  (0.007)  (0.007)  (0.007) (0.014)  (0.014) (0.004)  (0.005) 
 
Oncall 0.001   -0.029***  -0.039***  0.007  0.014  -0.008 -0.007  -0.007 -0.011 
workers (0.014)    (0.013)  (0.014)  (0.014)  (0.015) (0.029)  (0.030) (0.007)  (0.009) 
 
Contract  0.047*    0.171*** 0.177***  0.117*** 0.116***  0.039  0.040  0.101*** 0.134*** 
workers (0.024)    (0.029)  (0.031)  (0.029)  (0.032) (0.061)  (0.063) (0.015)  (0.020) 
 
Independent  0.106***    0.198*** 0.200***  0.150*** 0.140***  0.121*** 0.116***  0.145*** 0.160*** 
contractors (0.008)    (0.008)  (0.009)  (0.008) (0.009)  (0.015) (0.015)  (0.004) (0.006) 
 
Notes:  See Notes and text to Table 5. 
 Table 7:  OLS Cross-Section Estimates of Atypical Worker Wage Differentials, NLSY79 Data  
 (dependent variable: log hourly wage)  
 
Variable 1994  1996  1998 
 
Screened -0.011  0.039*  0.014 
workers  (0.047) (0.021) (0.019) 
 
Temporary  -0.075 -0.060 -0.149*** 
workers  (0.047) (0.046) (0.043) 
 
Contractors/ 0.052  0.161**  0.075 
consultants  (0.080) (0.075) (0.066) 
 
Other work  0.133  0.233*  0.130** 
types (0.093) (0.138) (0.058) 
 
Jobs -0.028**  -0.014 -0.020 
(standardized)  (0.013) (0.013) (0.015) 
 
Experience  0.001 0.003 0.004 
  (0.009) (0.009) (0.007) 
 
Experience
2  0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
 
Tenure  0.040*** 0.038*** 0.034*** 
  (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) 
 
Tenure
2 -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.001*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
 
n 5,551  5,702  5,666 
Adjusted R
2  0.40 0.42 0.44 
 
Notes: Huber-White standard errors to correct for heteroskedasticity in parentheses. 
***, **, * denote significance at the .01, .05, and .10 levels, respectively. 
Additional controls are age (and age
2), gender and ethnicity, a dummy variable equal to one if married (zero otherwise), an interaction term 
between gender (being female) and marital status, education (in years), a dummy variable equal to one if residing in an urban area (zero 
otherwise), four regional dummies (the omitted category is residing in the Northeast), ten industry dummies (the omitted category is 
agriculture/fishing/forestry), and six occupational dummies (the omitted category is manager). 
 
F-tests were conducted to determine the following restrictions, with test statistic ρ and p-value (in parentheses) reported below: 
 
    1994    1996    1998 
βAGENCY TEMP=βDIRECT-HIRE TEMP   ρ=3.60 (p=0.058)    ρ=0.00 (p=0.999)    ρ=2.60 (p=0.107) 
βTEMP=βC//C=βOTHER     ρ=2.90 (p=0.033)    ρ=3.40 (p=0.028)    ρ=6.82 (p=0.000) 
 
  36Table 8:  Corrected OLS Cross-Section Estimates of Atypical Worker Wage Differentials, NLSY79 Data 
 
Variable 1994  1996  1998 
 
Screened -0.025*  0.044***  -0.003 
workers  (0.015) (0.016) (0.003) 
 
Temporary  -0.058* -0.052* -0.147*** 
workers  (0.031) (0.031) (0.027) 
 
Contractors/  0.243*** 0.359*** 0.206*** 
consultants  (0.050) (0.051) (0.039) 
 
Other work  0.167**  0.391***  0.090 
types (0.075) (0.124) (0.059) 
 
Notes:  See text and notes to Table 7. 
  37Table 9:  Corrected OLS Cross-Section Estimates of Atypical Worker Wage Differentials Using Ability Proxies, 
NLSY79 Data 
 
Variable 1994  1996  1998 
 
Screened -0.030**  0.036  -0.001 
workers  (0.015) (0.016) (0.014) 
 
Temporary  -0.064** -0.070** -0.140*** 
workers  (0.031) (0.032) (0.027) 
 
Contractors/  0.213*** 0.337*** 0.267*** 
consultants  (0.049) (0.032) (0.027) 
 
Other work  0.190**  0.404***  0.083 
types (0.084) (0.130) (0.059) 
 
Coding 0.022***  0.006  0.003* 
ability  (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
 
Math  0.045*** 0.056*** 0.049*** 
ability  (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
 
Practical  0.013 0.017 0.005 
ability  (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) 
 
Verbal  0.005 0.008 0.018* 
ability  (0.011) (0.011) (0.010) 
 
n 5,280  5,435  5,391 
Adjusted R
2  0.41 0.43 0.46 
 
Notes:  See text and Notes to Table 7 
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Table 10:  Corrected Panel Estimates of Atypical Worker Wage Differentials, NLSY79 Data 
 
  Random Effects OLS  Fixed Effects OLS 
  Full Males  Females  Full Males  Females 
Variable  Sample Only  Only  Sample Only  Only 
 
Screened  0.032***  -0.009*** 0.087***  0.046*** 0.014*** 0.087*** 
workers  (0.002) (0.003) (0.003)  (0.002) (0.004) (0.003) 
 
Temporary  -0.170*** -0.265*** -0.075*** -0.048***  -0.180***  0.131*** 
workers  (0.006) (0.008) (0.009)  (0.007) (0.009) (0.013) 
 
Contractors/  0.313*** 0.304*** 0.304***  0.196*** 0.308***  -0.032* 
consultants  (0.010) (0.012) (0.025)  (0.012) (0.023) (0.019) 
 
Other  work  0.482*** 0.374*** 0.785***  0.394*** 0.160*** 1.222*** 
types  (0.020) (0.021) (0.057)  (0.028) (0.026) (0.173) 
 
Jobs  -0.027*** -0.040*** -0.020*  -0.019 -0.001 -0.033 
  (0.009) (0.015) (0.012)  (0.029) (0.040) (0.041) 
 
Experience  0.015*** 0.020*** 0.008  0.087*** 0.145*** 0.038 
  (0.005) (0.008) (0.007)  (0.029) (0.032) (0.049) 
 
Experience
2  0.001***  0.000 0.001***  -0.000  -0.001 0.000 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) 
 
Tenure  0.027*** 0.023*** 0.034***  0.017*** 0.011*** 0.023*** 
  (0.002) (0.003) (0.003)  (0.004) (0.005) (0.006) 
 
Tenure
2  -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001***  -0.001*** -0.001*  -0.001*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
 
n  16,919 9,084  7,835  16,919 9,084  7,835 
Adjusted R
2  0.41 0.37 0.42  0.24 0.16 0.28 
 
Notes: ***, **, * denote significance at the .01, .05, and .10 levels, respectively. 
Additional controls are age (and age
2), a dummy variable equal to one if married (zero otherwise), an interaction term between gender (being 
female) and marital status, education (in years), a dummy variable equal to one if residing in an urban area (zero otherwise), four regional 
dummies (omitted category is residing in the Northeast), ten industrial dummies (omitted category is working in agriculture/fishing/forestry), and 
six occupational dummies (omitted category is employment as a manager). 
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Table 11: Availability of Employer-Related Health Insurance by Employment Arrangement, CAEAS/CPS Data   
(in percent) 
 
  1995 1997 1999 2001 
 
Regular  workers  83.3% 83.1% 84.3% 85.7% 
Screened workers  90.0 91.5 93.8 91.4 
Temporary  workers  45.1 54.8 52.2 60.8 
Oncall  workers  30.4 36.4 37.0 43.7 
Contract  workers  64.5 65.6 68.4 53.0 
Independent  contractors  34.1 30.6 32.5 22.1 




Table 12: Availability of Employer-Related Health Insurance by Employment Arrangement, NLSY79 Data 
(in percent) 
 
 1994  1996  1998 
 
Regular  workers  80.3% 81.1% 83.3% 
Screened workers  90.4 87.3 88.1 
Temporary  workers  35.4 35.6 39.9 
Contractors/consultants  19.3 29.7 30.4 
Other  work  types  39.7 44.5 80.5 
n 5,377  5,433  5,289 
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Table 13: Logit Estimates of Access to Employer-Related Health Insurance Benefits, CAEAS/CPS Data 
 
Variable 1995 1997 1999 2001  Pooled 
 
Screened  0.554*** 0.556***  0.762*** 0.738***  0.960*** 0.952***  0.439*  0.442*  0.707*** 0.698*** 
workers  (0.140) (0.141)  (0.148) (0.149)  (0.172) (0.172)  (0.243) (0.244)  (0.082) (0.082) 
  [0.077] [0.074]  [0.107] [0.099]  [0.124] [0.118] [0.047]  [0.045] [0.094]  [0.082] 
 
Temporary  -1.633*** -1.599***  -1.346*** -1.320***  -1.298*** -1.274***  -1.315*** -1.309***  -1.415*** -1.389*** 
workers  (0.059) (0.060)  (0.055) (0.056)  (0.056) (0.057)  (0.114) (0.116)  (0.031) (0.032) 
  [-0.228] [-0.212]  [-0.189] [-0.177]  [-0.168] [-0.158]  [-0.141] [-0.133]  [-0.118] [-0.176] 
 
Oncall  -1.813*** -1.845***  -1.583*** -1.561***  -1.656*** -1.659***  -1.616*** -1.593***  -1.673*** -1.672*** 
workers  (0.103) (0.106)  (0.101) (0.103)  (0.099) (0.101)  (0.209) (0.211)  (0.056) (0.057) 
  [-0.253] [-0.245]  [-0.223] [-0.209]  [-0.215] [-0.206]  [-0.173] [-0.161]  [-0.223] [-0.212] 
 
Contract  -0.198 -0.220  -0.090 -0.222  -0.402**  -0.460**  -1.221*** -1.367***  -0.293*** -0.359*** 
workers  (0.172) (0.175)  (0.193) (0.193)  (0.194) (0.198)  (0.402) (0.413)  (0.103) (0.104) 
  [-0.028] [-0.029]  [-0.013] [-0.030]  [-0.052] [-0.057]  [-0.131] [-0.139]  [-0.039] [-0.046] 
 
Independent  -2.226*** -2.407***  -2.308*** -2.516***  -2.462*** -2.621***  -2.902*** -2.792***  -2.367*** -2.518*** 
contractors  (0.128) (0.136)  (0.141) (0.148)  (0.149) (0.155)  (0.295) (0.297) (0.077)  (0.080) 
  [-0.311] [-0.320]  [-0.325] [-0.338]  [-0.319] [-0.326]  [-0.310] [-0.283]  [-0.315] [-0.391] 
 
Hourly  wage   0.074***   0.073***   0.055***   0.052***   0.064*** 
   (0.004)   (0.004)   (0.004)   (0.005)   (0.002) 
   [0.010]   [0.010]   [0.007]   [0.005]   [0.008] 
 
n  18,518 18,447 18,718  7,988  63,688 
Log L  -7,647.72  -7,448.44  -7,860.00  -7,666.96 -7,655.91  -7,513.90 -2,959.66 -2,904.18  -26,212.52  -25,631.03 
 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses, marginal effects in brackets. 
***, **, * denote significance at the .01, .05, and .10 levels, respectively. 
Additional controls are age (and age
2), gender and ethnicity, a dummy variable equal to one if married (zero otherwise), an interaction term between gender (being female) and marital status, six 
educational dummies (the omitted category is no high school diploma), a dummy variable equal to one if residing in an urban area (zero otherwise), four regional dummies (the omitted category is 
residing in the Northeast), ten industry dummies (the omitted category is agriculture/fishing/forestry), and six occupational dummies (the omitted category is manager). 
 
Using the results obtained from specifications omitting wage controls, likelihood ratio tests were conducted to determine the following restrictions, with test statistic ρ and p-value (in parenthesis) 
reported below: 
 
   1995    1997    1999    2001    Pooled 
βAGENCY TEMP =βDIRECT-HIRE TEMP:  ρ=  69.61 (p=0.000)    ρ=  90.15 (p=0.000)    ρ=  79.77 (p=0.000)    ρ=22.38 (p=0.000)    ρ=268.43 (p=0.000) 
βCiW=βIC:     ρ=  96.51 (p=0.000)    ρ=  91.71 (p=0.000)    ρ=  74.19 (p=0.000)    ρ=11.29 (p=0.001)    ρ=277.85 (p=0.000) 
βTEMP=βOC=βCW=βIC:   ρ=171.41 (p=0.000)    ρ=188.06 (p=0.000)    ρ=170.97 (p=0.000)    ρ=46.38 (p-0.000)    ρ=567.43 (p=0.000)
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Table 14: Logit Estimates of Access to Employer-Related Health Insurance Benefits, NLSY79 Data 
 
Variable 1994  1996  1998 
 
Screened  0.469*** 0.482***  0.458*** 0.447***  0.597*** 0.609*** 
workers (0.167)  (0.167)  (0.162) (0.162)  (0.190) (0.191) 
 [0.059]  [0.060]  [0.056]  [0.055] [0.064]  [0.062] 
 
Temporary -1.679***  -1.642***  -1.597*** -1.583***  -1.814*** -1.695*** 
workers (0.276)  (0.277)  (0.290) (0.291)  (0.308) (0.309) 
  [-0.211] [-0.204]  [-0.196] [-0.194]  [-0.196] [-0.173] 
 
Contractors/ -2.838***  -2.944***  -2.327*** -2.432***  -2.340*** -2.569*** 
consultants (0.324)  (0.332)  (0.322) (0.332)  (0.366) (0.390) 
  [-0.357] [-0.365]  [-0.286] [-0.297]  [-0.253] [-0.262] 
 
Jobs -0.126  -0.119  -0.108  -0.109 -0.260***  -0.241*** 
(standardized) (0.081)  (0.081)  (0.080) (0.080)  (0.092) (0.092) 
  [-0.016] [-0.015]  [-0.013] [-0.013]  [-0.028] [-0.025] 
 
Experience  -0.090 -0.085  -0.043 -0.040  0.003  0.017 
 (0.060)  (0.059)  (0.051)  (0.051) (0.047)  (0.047) 
  [-0.011] [-0.011]  [-0.005] [-0.005]  [0.000]  [0.002] 
 
Experience
2  0.007***  0.006** 0.005**  0.005** 0.002  0.001 
 (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.002)  (0.002) (0.002)  (0.002) 
 [0.001]  [0.001]  [0.001]  [0.001] [0.000]  [0.000] 
 
Tenure  0.299*** 0.289***  0.148*** 0.143***  0.132*** 0.113*** 
 (0.032)  (0.032)  (0.029)  (0.029) (0.029)  (0.029 
 [0.038]  [0.036]  [0.018]  [0.017] [0.014]  [0.012] 
 
Tenure
2 -0.013***  -0.013***  -0.005**  -0.005** -0.003*  -0.003 
 (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002) (0.002)  (0.002) 
  [-0.002] [-0.002]  [-0.001] [-0.001]  [-0.003] [-0.000] 
 
Hourly  wage   0.032***  0.014**   0.058*** 
   (0.007)   (0.006)   (0.008) 
   [0.004]   [0.002]   [0.006] 
 
n  5,377 5,433 5,289 
Log L  -2,131.28  -2,118.86  -2,181.77 -2,178.33  -1,995.46 -1,964.94 
 
Notes: Standard errors are given in parentheses and marginal effects in brackets.   
***, **, * denote significance at the .01, .05, and .10 levels, respectively. 
Additional controls are age (and age
2), gender and ethnicity, a dummy variable equal to one if married (zero otherwise), an interaction term 
between gender (being female) and marital status, education (in years), a dummy variable equal to one if residing in an urban area (zero 
otherwise), four regional dummies (the omitted category is residing in the Northeast), ten industry dummies (the omitted category is 
agriculture/fishing/forestry), and six occupational dummies (the omitted category is manager). 
 
Using the specifications that excluded wage controls, likelihood ratio tests were conducted to determine the following restrictions, with test 
statistic ρ and p-value (in parentheses) reported below: 
 
    1994    1996    1998 
βAGENCY TEMP=βDIRECT-HIRE TEMP   ρ=  0.03 (p=0.866)    ρ=0.32 (p=0.574)    ρ=  0.00 (p=0.948) 
βTEMP=βC//C=βOTHER     ρ=11.33 (p=0.010]    ρ=6.25 (p=0.100)    ρ=16.53 (p=0.001) Table 15:  Panel Estimates of Access to Employer-Related Health Insurance Benefits (NLSY79 data) 
 
  Random Effects Logit  Fixed Effects Logit   
 Full  Males  Females  Full Males  Females 
Variable  Sample Only  Only  Sample Only  Only 
 
Screened  0.682*** 0.671*** 0.554*** 0.560*** 0.792*** 0.791***  0.608*** 0.590*** 0.751**  0.750*** 0.506  0.440 
workers  (0.137) (0.134) (0.184) (0.184) (0.204) (0.205)  (0.203) (0.202) (0.276) (0.276) (0.325) (0.323) 
  [0.109] [0.106] [0.087] [0.088] [0.127] [0.127]  [0.096] [0.094] [0.118] [0.118] [0.081] [0.071] 
 
Temporary  -2.322*** -2.237*** -1.944  -1.879*** -2.662*** -2.645***  -1.285*** -1.288*** -1.024** -1.025** -1.501***  -1.509*** 
workers  (0.240) (0.234) (0.335) (0.334) (0.338) (0.337)  (0.331) (0.331) (0.441) (0.448) (0.500) (0.503) 
  [-0.368] [-0.355] [-0.305] [-0.295] [-0.427] [-0.424]  [-0.204] [-0.204] [-0.161] [-0.161] [-0.241] [-0.242] 
 
Contractors/  -3.235*** -3.281*** -3.093*** -3.160*** -3.376*** -3.564***  -1.417*** -1.414*** -1.422*** -1.424*** -1.802  -1.699 
consultants  (0.280) (0.275) (0.333) (0.335) (0.511) (0.514)  (0.393) (0.396) (0.437) (0.438) (1.095) (1.089) 
  [-0.513] [-0.520] [-0.486] [-0.496] [-0.542] [-0.572]  [-0.225] [-0.224] [-0.223] [-0.224] [-0.289] [-0.273] 
 
Other work  -0.998**  -1.039***  -0.754  -0.816*  -1.415*  -1.496**  -0.830  -0.787 0.201 0.213 
1 
1
types  (0.406) (0.399) (0.492) (0.495) (0.738) (0.740)  (0.678) (0.679) (0.885) (0.886) 
  [-0.158] [-0.165] [-0.118] [-0.128] [-0.227] [-0.240]  [-0.132]  [-0.125] [0.032] [0.033] 
 
Jobs  -0.279*** -0.268*** -0.356*** -0.354*** -0.151  -0.144  -0.011  -0.019 0.566 0.555 0.012 0.002 
  (0.079) (0.076) (0.115) (0.115) (0.107) (0.107)  (0.420) (0.422) (0.766) (0.766) (0.585) (0.589) 
  [-0.044] [-0.043] [-0.056] [-0.056] [-0.024] [-0.023]  [-0.002]  [-0.003] [0.089] [0.087] [0.002] [0.000] 
 
Experience -0.050 -0.047 -0.293***  -0.297***  0.107*  0.115**  0.242 0.251  -0.027  -0.025 0.487 0.503 
  (0.044) (0.043) (0.074) (0.074) (0.059) (0.059)  (0.222) (0.222) (0.347) (0.347) (0.315) (0.316) 
  [-0.008] [-0.007] [-0.046] [-0.047]  [0.017]  [0.018]  [0.038] [0.040]  [-0.004]  [-0.004] [0.078] [0.081] 
 
Experience
2  0.006*** 0.005*** 0.015*** 0.014*** 0.000  -0.001  0.002 0.002 0.012*  0.012*  -0.005  -0.004 
  (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002)  (0.005) (0.005) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
  [0.001] [0.001] [0.002] [0.002] [0.000]  [-0.000]  [0.000] [0.000] [0.002] [0.002]  [-0.001]  [-0.001] 
 
Tenure  0.287*** 0.271*** 0.251*** 0.244*** 0.320*** 0.308***  0.380*** 0.387*** 0.303*** 0.304*** 0.477*** 0.491*** 
  (0.025) (0.024) (0.033) (0.037) (0.037) (0.037)  (0.047) (0.047) (0.065) (0.065) (0.073) (0.074) 
  [0.046] [0.043] [0.039] [0.038] [0.051] [0.049]  [0.060] [0.061] [0.048] [0.048] [0.077] [0.079] 
 
Tenure
2  -0.011*** -0.010*** -0.010*** -0.009*** -0.012*** -0.012***  -0.024*** -0.025*** -0.018*** -0.018*** -0.032*** -0.033*** 
  (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)  (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) 
  [-0.002] [-0.002] [-0.002] [-0.001] [-0.002] [-0.002]  [-0.004] [-0.004] [-0.003] [-0.003] [-0.005] [-0.005] 
 
Hourly  wage   0.026***   0.026***   0.030***   -0.012*   -0.003   -0.020* 
   (0.005)   (0.006)   (0.008)   (0.006)   (0.008)   (0.011) 
    [0.004]   [0.004]   [0.005]    [-0.002]   [-0.000]   [-0.003] 
 
n  16,099  8,740 7,359  2,746 1,458 1,288 
Log  L  -5,893.27 -5,889.15 -3,126.55 -3,116.40 -2,711.30 -2,703.89  -847.90  -846.23 -459.42 -459.37 -364.52 -362.82 
 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses, marginal effects in brackets.  
1Omitted due to collinearity issues. ***, **, * denote significance at the .01, .05, and .10 levels, respectively. 
Additional controls are age (and age
2), a dummy variable equal to one if married (zero otherwise), an interaction term between gender (being female) and marital status, education (in years), a dummy variable equal to one if 
residing in an urban area (zero otherwise), four regional dummies (omitted category is residing in the Northeast), ten industrial dummies (omitted category is working in agriculture/fishing/forestry), and six occupational 
dummies (omitted category is employment as a manager. 
 43Appendix Table 1: Full OLS Regression Estimates of Atypical Worker Wage Differentials, Pooled CAEAS/CPS Data  
(dependent variable: log hourly wage) 
 
Screened 0.009  Temporary  -0.102*** 
workers (0.009)  workers (0.007) 
 
Oncall -0.077  Contract  0.084*** 
workers (0.014)  workers (0.021) 
 
Independent 0.002  Age  0.038*** 
contractors (0.008)    (0.001) 
 
Age
2 -0.000***  Female  -0.139*** 
 (0.000)   (0.006) 
 
Black -0.085*** Other -0.051*** 
 (0.006)  ethnicity`  (0.008) 
 
Married 0.089***  Married  -0.096*** 
 (0.005)  female  (0.007) 
 
High school  0.176***  Some  0.245*** 
diploma (0.006)  college  (0.007) 
 
Associates 0.292***  Bachelors  0.411*** 
degree (0.008)  degree (0.008) 
 
Masters 0.507***  JD/MD/PhD  0.548*** 
degree (0.010)    (0.014) 
 
Urban 0.507***  Northcentral  -0.042*** 
 (0.004)   (0.005) 
 
South -0.085*** West  -0.019*** 
 (0.005)   (0.005) 
 
Construction/ 0.135  Manufacture  0.147*** 
mining (0.017)    (0.016) 
 
Transportation, comm..  0.199*** Retail/wholesale  -0.078*** 
and utilities  (0.017)  trade  (0.016) 
 
Finance, insurance  0.125*** Business  0.044*** 
and real estate  (0.017) services  (0.017) 
 
Personal -0.041**  Professional  0.022 
services (0.018)  services (0.016) 
 
Public 0.201*** Technical/  -0.124*** 
administration (0.017)  sales  workers  (0.007) 
 
Clerical -0.252***  Operators/  -0.333*** 
workers (0.006)  laborers (0.007) 
 
Service -0.418***  Skilled -0.154***   
workers (0.007)  labor  (0.007) 
 
1997 0.047***  1999 0.123*** 








  44Appendix Table 2: Full OLS Cross Section Regression Estimates of Atypical Worker Wage Differentials, 1998 Cross Section 
NLSY79 Data  
(dependent variable: log hourly wage) 
 
Screened 0.014  Temporary  -0.149*** 
workers (0.019)  workers (0.043) 
 
Contractors/ 0.075  Other  work  0.130** 
consultants (0.066)  types  (0.058) 
 
Experience 0.004  Experience
2 0.001*** 




 (0.004)   (0.000) 
 
Jobs -0.020  Age -0.028 
(standardized) (0.015)    (0.084) 
 
Age
2 0.000  Female  -0.109*** 
 (0.001)   (0.018) 
 
Black -0.051*** Hispanic  -0.015 
 (0.014)   (0.017) 
 
Married 0.119***  Married  -0.128*** 
 (0.017)  female  (0.023) 
 
Education 0.065***  Urban  0.005 
 (0.003)   (0.013) 
 
Northcentral -0.103***  South  -0.145*** 
 (0.019)   (0.017) 
 
West 0.001  Construction/  0.300*** 
 (0.021)   (0.056) 
 
Manufacture 0.266***  Transportation,  comm.  0.307*** 
 (0.053)  and  utilities  (0.055) 
 
Retail/wholesale -0.016  Finance, insurance  0.301*** 
trade  (0.054)  and real estate  (0.058) 
 
Business 0.232***  Personal 0.026 
services (0.056)  services (0.060) 
 
Professional 0.082  Public  0.267*** 
services (0.054)  administration  (0.055) 
 
Technical/ -0.053** Clerical  -0.243*** 
sales workers  (0.025)  workers  (0.017) 
 
Operators/ -0.325***  Service  -0.254*** 









  45Appendix Table 3: Full Logit Regression Estimates of the Determinants of Access to Employer-Related Health Insurance Benefits, 
Pooled CAEAS/CPS Data  
 
Screened 0.707***  Temporary  -1.415*** 
workers (0.082)  workers (0.031) 
 [0.094]    [-0.188] 
 
Oncall -1.673***  Contract  -0.293*** 
workers (0.056)  workers (0.103) 
 [-0.223]   [-0.039] 
 
Independent -2.367***  Age  0.078*** 
contractors (0.077)    (0.009) 
 [-0.315]    [0.010] 
 
Age
2 -0.001  Female  -0.197*** 
 (0.000)   (0.040) 
 
Black 0.209***  Other  -0.031 
 (0.040)  ethnicities  (0.051) 
 [0.028]    [-0.004] 
 
Married 0.334***  Married  -0.652*** 
 (0.036)  female  (0.047) 
 [0.044]    [-0.087] 
 
High school  0.496***  Some  0.595*** 
diploma (0.038)  college  (0.042) 
 [0.066]   [0.079] 
 
Associates 0.759***  Bachelors  0.842*** 
degree (0.052)  degree (0.048) 
 [0.101]   [0.112] 
 
Masters 1.082***  JD/MD/PhD  1.264*** 
degree (0.067)    (0.104) 
 [0.144]   [0.168] 
 
Urban 0.178***  Northcentral  0.056* 
 (0.026)   (0.034) 
 [0.024]   [0.007] 
 
South -0.043  West  -0.116*** 
 (0.032)   (0.033) 
 [-0.006]   [-0.015] 
 
Construction/ 0.171*  Manufacture  1.687*** 
 (0.094)   (0.092) 
 [0.023]   [0.225] 
 
Transportation, comm.  1.295*** Retail/wholesale  0.398*** 
and utilities  (0.095)  trade  (0.087) 
 [0.172]   [0.053] 
 
Finance, insurance  1.064*** Business  0.293*** 
and real estate  (0.096) services  (0.093) 
 [0.142]   [0.039] 
 
Personal -0.069  Professional  0.970*** 
services (0.096)  services (0.087) 
 [-0.009]    [0.129] 
 
Public 2.261*** Technical/  -0.369*** 
administration (0.108)  sales  workers  (0.041) 
 [0.301]    [-0.049] 
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Clerical -0.192  Operators/  -0.674*** 
workers (0.040)  laborers (0.046) 
 [-0.026]   [-0.090] 
 
Service -1.103***  Skilled -0.462*** 
workers (0.041)  labor  (0.049) 
 [-0.147]   [-0.061] 
 
1997 0.009  1999 0.097*** 
 (0.029)   (0.029) 







log L  -26,212.52 
 
 
  47Appendix Table 4: Full Logit Regression Estimates of the Determinants of Access to Employer-Related Health Insurance Benefits (1998 
NLSY79 data)  
 
Screened 0.597***  Temporary  -1.814*** 
workers (0.190)  workers (0.308) 
 [0.064]    [-0.196] 
 
Contractors/ -2.340***  Other  -0.102 
consultants (0.366)  work  types (0.473) 
 [-0.253]   [-0.011] 
 
Experience 0.003  Experience
2 0.002 
 (0.047)   (0.002) 




 (0.029)   (0.002) 
 [0.014]    [-0.000] 
 
Jobs -0.260***  Age  0.692 
(standardized) (0.092)    (0.600) 
 [-0.028]    [0.075] 
 
Age
2 -0.010  Female  0.088 
 (0.008)   (0.127) 
 [-0.001]    [0.009] 
 
Black 0.314***  Hispanic  0.025 
 (0.105)   (0.119) 
 [0.034]   [0.003] 
 
Married 0.523***  Married  -0.607*** 
 (0.117)  female  (0.163) 
 [0.056]    [-0.066] 
 
Education 0.088***  Urban  0.090 
 (0.021)   (0.092) 
 [0.010]   [0.010] 
 
Northcentral -0.023  South  0.038 
 (0.135)   (0.125) 
 [-0.003]    [0.004] 
 
West 0.277*  Construction/  0.534** 
 (0.146)  mining  (0.258) 
 [0.030]   [0.058] 
 
Manufacture 2.174***  Transportation,  comm.  1.675*** 
 (0.257)  and  utilities  (0.274) 
 [0.235]   [0.181] 
 
Retail/wholesale 0.716***  Finance, insurance  1.357*** 
trade  (0.242)  and real estate  (0.290) 
 [0.077]   [0.146] 
 
Business 0.936***  Personal 0.107 
services (0.258)  services (0.274) 
 [0.101]   [0.012] 
 
Professional 1.386***  Public  2.456*** 
services (0.249)  administration  (0.343)   
 [0.150]   [0.265] 
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Technical/ -0.023  Clerical  -0.054 
sales workers  (0.178)  workers  (0.138) 
 [-0.002]   [-0.006] 
 
Operators/ -0.584***  Service  -0.582*** 
laborers (0.151)  workers (0.128) 







log L  -1,994.46 
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